For Giorgia Meloni, the Ceuta crisis is not a problem. It is for Pedro Sánchez – and a serious one – but not for the Italian prime minister, who has clearly exaggerated the risk that some of the 8,000 immigrants still accumulating in the Spanish enclave – the vast majority of the more than 70,000 who stormed the Spanish border on July 30 and 31 immediately turned back – could end up reaching Italy. More concerning for Meloni is the constant flow of irregular immigrants who continue to arrive through the south of her country, via the central Mediterranean route: through this route, 16,454 people arrived in Europe between January and July, a number higher than those who entered through Spain combining all routes (11,537 via the Mediterranean and 2,856 via the Canary Islands), according to the latest Frontex data.
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However, no European country – except Spain, which did so as retaliation – has thought of suspending the application of the Schengen free movement treaty with the transalpine country. Nor has there been any voice so far calling for the reinstatement of border controls with Italy after it was revealed that one of the Russian agents identified by Germany as suspects in the foiled attack at Leipzig airport had an Italian visa. And yet, Italy has done so with Spain.
Despite the official discourse claiming otherwise, Italy does not have many lessons to give Europe on immigration management. Not only because the central Mediterranean route remains the main focus of irregular immigration to the EU, but also because the so-called “innovative” magic recipe of creating external deportation centers in third countries, which the Italian government has implemented in Albania, has proven to be a failure (questioned by the Italian judiciary, the centers have been practically empty for two years).
It is paradoxical that, despite this reality, the European Commission and most EU governments have uncritically embraced the idea of outsourcing foreign deportation centers following the Italian model as if it were a panacea. But the discourse of the pragmatic post-fascist Meloni – as defined by The New York Times – is what is predominantly accepted in Europe today.
The clearest demonstration was the follow-the-leader attitude most European governments took towards the initiative led by Meloni and the supposedly social-democratic Danish prime minister, Mette Frederiksen, to blame the Spanish government for the Ceuta crisis, linking it to the extraordinary regularization of hundreds of thousands of immigrants residing in Spain. A total of 22 countries – an absolute majority – signed a belligerent letter demanding the reinstatement of border controls with our country. Italy did so, and Spain responded in kind. Both governments have again extended this week the suspension of Schengen for another fifteen days.
By contrast, the European restraint – coinciding here with that of the Spanish government – in imputing and demanding responsibilities from Morocco for what happened in Ceuta is striking. Striking but not surprising, since the European bet on subcontracting the control of migratory flows to the countries of the southern Mediterranean – setting aside any concern about the methods – implies giving them the key to the tap.
The pitiful lack of solidarity shown by Europeans towards Spain – only four countries refused to join the attack against the Sánchez government: France, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Portugal – sets a worrying precedent, and the main instigator, Italy itself, is going to start suffering it firsthand: taking advantage of the entry into force in June of the European Pact on Migration and Asylum (PEMA), and quietly, several countries from central and northern Europe – Germany, Austria, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden – have already proposed to start sending back to Italy thousands of irregular immigrants – possibly around 10,000 – detected on their soil who had entered through this country.
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No, Meloni’s problem is not Ceuta. It never has been. Her problem is called Roberto Vannacci, a far-right former general whose party, National Future, fiercely competes with the Italian prime minister’s party, the post-fascist Brothers of Italy, and is much more radical on what constitutes the flagship issue of their platform: immigration. And, less than a year before the next legislative elections – which could be brought forward to April – he has a voting expectation of 7%, equal to or ahead of the two coalition partners of the Italian prime minister – Antonio Tajani’s Forza Italia and Matteo Salvini’s League – which could jeopardize the happy continuity of the current Duracell government.
This scenario is far from being an Italian peculiarity. On the contrary, it is today the majority phenomenon in Europe, where the traditional Christian-democratic right has taken a marked drift towards far-right theses – particularly regarding foreign immigration of Islamic origin – to the point of validating and mainstreaming the ideological framework of the ultras, who no longer hide the racist and xenophobic substratum of their positions. This race to nowhere by conservatives to stop the hemorrhage of votes to their right has only fueled the ultras. Today, in the two major founding countries of Europe, which are also the two great economic and military powers of the continent, Germany and France, the far right leads the voting intention polls.
The latest available Eurobarometer prepared by the European Parliament – the spring one – paints a picture of public opinion in the 27 far removed from the collective hysteria stirred up by social networks and international bots – whether Russian or American – and echoed by political forces against the presence of foreign populations. The three issues that most concern citizens and that they believe should be addressed as a priority are inflation (47%), the economy and employment (35%), and defense and security (34%). Immigration and asylum policy (19%) appear in ninth position. Instead of paying attention to this data, the historic parties of the European right remain obsessed with obsessively revolving around the issue of immigration, constituting a dramatic suicidal impulse.
Iceland’s ‘no’. If one of the main arguments Icelanders had for wanting to integrate into Europe was the comforting feeling of not being alone against the appetites of the great international powers in the Arctic – there are the United States under Donald Trump wanting to keep Greenland – the events in Ceuta must have been a great antidote: the crisis with Morocco has shown that European solidarity is not goes without saying, it depends on the country that needs it, the reason, the circumstances, and the political color of those in power. Given what has been seen, and as jealous as they are of their important fishing grounds – whose control they resist sharing – Icelanders voted last Sunday – by 52.8% to 47.2% – against the resumption of European Union accession negotiations, interrupted since 2015. The result of the consultative referendum has fallen like a bucket of cold water on the EU, which still wonders why such disenchantment.
Hybrid war. There is nothing like being the leading European power for the solidarity of the 27 to activate automatically. This has happened with Germany, victim of a noticeable escalation in the hybrid war that Vladimir Putin’s Russia is waging against Europe, which has prompted the EU and NATO to close ranks. Friedrich Merz’s government officially accused Moscow on Tuesday of the foiled attack – with a drone loaded with explosives – on August 4 at Leipzig airport, which targeted a Ukrainian cargo plane. Berlin took several retaliatory decisions, including the closure of the Russian House in the German capital, a large cultural center that intelligence services suspect was used as a propaganda and espionage center. The Kremlin responded by doing the same with the Goethe Institute.
The Draghi club. Tired of the slow pace at which the EU addresses the implementation of its recommendations to boost the continent’s competitiveness, former Italian prime minister and former president of the European Central Bank (ECB), Mario Draghi, has decided to create a lobby, together with the president of the financial services company Stripe, Patrick Collison, to promote the adoption of the measures he advocated in his famous report. Named the Rhin Group and led by economist and former Spanish MEP Luis Garicano, it brings together about sixty economists, entrepreneurs, and bankers, including three Nobel laureates: Philippe Aghion, Bengt Holmström, and Katalin Karikó. Other Spanish members include BBVA president Carlos Torres; former minister Cristina Garmendia, president of the Cotec innovation foundation; and professor and former Generalitat counselor Andreu Mas-Colell, president of the board of trustees of the Barcelona Institute of Science and Technology (BIST)
